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Bank regulation often is argued to be in the public interest. The
rationalefor thisposition is thatan unregulatedbanking system wouldbe
characterized by marketfailures and reduced economic efficiency. This
view is widelyhelddespite the lack ofsystematic analysis ofwhy market
failures might arise in banking. This paper examines whether there are
aspectsofbanking that couldbe expectedto leadto marketfailures in the
absence of regulation. Our analysis suggests that, to be viable, a fiat
monetary system likely requires some degree ofbankregulation. We also
find that bank runs resultfrom a marketfailure related to poorly defined
property rightsfor depositors wheneverthe parvalue ofdeposits exceeds
the marketvalue ofbankassets. We conclude thatpublicpolicy measures
that help define and enforce depositor property rights could have a
positive effect on social welfare by eliminating runs andenhancing bank
stability.
Much has been made of the "deregulation" of
depository institutions. However, banking regula-
tions regarding entry, capital requirements, location
ofoffices, reserve requirements, and asset portfolio
composition are still in force. The public policy
debate concerningdepositoryinstitutionscenterson
whether deregulation should proceed or whether
there is a need to retain and perhaps even strengthen
some aspects ofbank regulation.
Arguments on both sides of this debate have
referred to "public interest" considerations. Propo-
nents of further deregulation point to the public
benefit from increased competition and gains in
economic efficiency. Theirdetractors appearto sup-
port continued regulation ofdepository institutions
at least in part because they believe that unrestricted
banking would not lead to the socially optimal
behavior as defined in a microeconomic model of
*Senior Economists, Federal Reserve B~ ofSan
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perfect competition. Key to the latter position is the
presence of market failures associated with bank-
ing. Specifically, government intervention in the
form of"correcting" market failures is presumed to
have the potential to enhance the public interest.
As central as market failures are to linking the
public interest to bank regulation, public policy
toward banking generally has beenformulated with-
out a clear articulation of what those failures may
be, why they may exist, or how regulation would
correct them. In part, this is due to lack of much
systematic analysisofpossible marketfailures asso-
ciated with banking. l
In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap by
examining how bank regulation, in principle at
least, might be related to the public interest because
of market failures in banking. By focusing on the
link between regulation and the public interest, we
do not mean to suggest that the structure of bank
regulation is shaped entirely or even primarily by
public interest considerations. The implementation
as well as the removal of regulatory constraints canresult in a redistribution of wealth among various
interest groups. Given the redistributive effects of
regulations, many analysts argue that it is the rela-
tive effectiveness ofthe affected groups in promot-
ing theirown interests that ultimately shapes public
policy. However, even within this "private interest"
view of regulation, public interest considerations
can play a role. This is because the dead weight
losses from economic inefficiencies, whetherdue to
market failures or regulation, will affect the degree
ofsupport for and opposition to regulations.
Since considerations of both public and private
interests can have a bearing on regulation, a com-
plete analysis ofbanking regulation would identify
the groups benefiting from and those harmed by
various regulations as well as the nature of market
failures, if any, that characterize banking. Such an
approach would be able to explain why certain
regulations exist, how regulations would change as
market forces change, how regulations affect the
redistribution ofincome, and how they mightrectify
market failures.
The purpose of our paper is not to explain the
incidence of regulation or to differentiate among
theories of regulation. Our approach is to examine
the conditions under which there could be market
failures in the operations of the banking industry
and to assess the types of public policy measures
that might address those failures.
The organization of our paper is as follows. In
Section I, we discuss the link between regulation
and the public interest. We also discuss, in general,
the sorts ofmarketfailures that are typically consid-
ered to justify regulation. Section II then investi-
gates specific sources ofmarket failures that might
lead to regulation in banking. The focus there is on
the connection between banks and the monetary
system and on the credit intermediation services of
banks. We also examine how market failures might
be related to instability in banking. Finally the
summary and conclusions are presented in Section
III.
I. Regulation and the Public Interest
Economic theories of government regulation
have been developed under two distinct lines of
thought - the public and private interest theories.
Within the public interest framework, the presence
of market failures sometimes makes it possible for
regulation to enhance economic efficiency. Micro-
economic theory focuses on three major types of
market failures - inadequate competition, exter-
nalities, and public goods - that lead an unregu-
lated private market to an equilibrium not neces-
sarily socially optimal.
Inadequate competition could arise in a market
because ofcartels orbecause ofeconomies ofscale
in production in the relevant range ofdemand (that
is, "natural monopolies"). Government interven-
tion in terms oflegal prohibitions and penalties for
anticompetitive behavior(antitrustlaws and regula-
tions) and the regulation or control of natural
monopolies have been rationalized as public interest
responses to this type ofmarket failure.
The main reason a competitive market would fail
to achieve an efficient allocation and production of
resources is the existence of nonpecuniary exter-
nalities. In such cases, the consumption or produc-
tion ofgoods imposes costs or bestows benefits on
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parties not directly involved through some non-
market channel. As Coase (1960) has shown, exter-
nalities arise whenever property rights are nonexis-
tent or poorly defined.
An extreme case of a good characterized by
positiveexternalitiesis apurepublicgood-that is,
a good whose quantity does not diminish as the
number of persons consuming it increases. Pure
public goods are characterized by the quality of
nonexcludability, which makes it impossible (or too
costly) for a competitive private market to charge a
positive price for them. As a result, the private
market cannot provide them.
Pigou's solution to externalities was the imposi-
tion of taxes or subsidies. But in some cases, the
legal assignment of property rights, regulation, or
the governmental provision of public goods may
internalize the externalities.
In contrast to the public interest framework for
regulation, the private interest approach, perhaps
most often associated with the pioneering work of
George Stigler (1971, 1975), sees regulation as
being sought by an industry (through political
activities) to further its own well-being. Often, the
industry desires regulation to shield itself from therigors ofcompetition. In a sense, the private interest
theory views regulation as analogous to a system of
taxes and subsidies in which the regulated group
receives subsidies at the expense of some other
"taxed" group, or vice versa. The implicit taxes of
regulation, however, are often hidden or indirect,
like entry restrictions, price controls, exemptions
from antitrust laws, orprohibitions on certain types
of activities. Similarly, the subsidies are not direct
payments by government but are the higher-than-
normal profits that result from regulations. 2
Nevertheless, even within a private interest the-
ory approach to regulation, market failures and the
impact ofregulation on economic efficiency can be
important. This is shown in arecent work by Becker
(1983) that attempts to bridge the public and private
interest theories of regulation. Becker develops a
model of competition among political pressure
groups in which, in keeping with a private interest
framework, the groups compete to secure legisla-
tion beneficial to their own interests. This model
departs from the more traditional private interest
theory ofregulationby considering the effects ofthe
deadweight costs oftaxes and subsidies on political
pressure.
In the context ofthis paper, an important implica-
tionofBecker's integrated theory is that there are
pressures to adopt public policies (regulations) that
overcome market failures, and hence raise effi-
ciency. Regulations that enhance efficiency to the
benefit of all groups will be widely supported and
unopposed. Even efficiency-enhancing regulations
that harm some groups may be adopted ifthe gains
to society sufficientlyoutweigh theharmimposed.3
Economic inefficiencies related to market
failures are thus relevant to both the public and
private interesttheories ofregulation. As aresult, an
important first step in analyzing bank regulation
would be to determine the natureofmarketfailures,
ifany, in banking. In the next section, we examine
the arguments for why market failures mightexistin
banking. We focus on market failures related to
externalities (including public goods) rather than
inadequate competition. In doing so, we recognize
that some components of the payment system in
which banks have a role, such as check clearing and
funds transfers, are probablycharacterized by econ-
omies of scale. In fact, the Federal Reserve is a
major provider ofboth services. Also, various gov-
ernment agencies regulate bank mergers. These are
not, however, practices subject to much controversy
that stems from the special features ofbanks.
II. Why Regulate Banks?
As indicated earlier, the presence ofexternalities
gives rise at least to the potential for regulation to
improve efficiency in production. Banks' (the term
is used here to represent all depository institutions)
provision ofmonetary and credit services usually is
cited as the main reason banking should be the focus
of public policy concern. It is often argued that
government oversight ofmoney creation, the opera-
tion of a monetary payment system, and credit
intermediation is necessary. In addition, some argue
that unregulated competitive banking would be
unstable and susceptible to runs with widespread
adverse effects.
The Monetary System
Some economists have argued that banks should
be regulated because oftheir key role in the mone-
tary system. Others argue that banks need not have a
57
special role and the fact that they do in most current
monetary systems is a result ofregulation - not a
reason for regulation.
Much of this debate turns on what is meant by
"money" and whether banks create money. Some
economists have argued·that, because banks have
the power to create money, an unregulated banking
system would leadeitherto an infinite orindetermi-
nate price level (see Johnson, 1968; Pesek and
Saving, 1967; and Gurley and Shaw, 1960); while
others (most notably Tobin, 1963, and Fama, 1983)
have argued that banks do not create "money"and
that regulation is not needed to make the price level
determinant.
In sorting through these positions, it is useful to
keep in mind that money has two essential, highly
related, but sometimes separate economic func-
tions. Itis the numeraire or unit ofaccount in whichprices are quoted, and it is a medium of exchange
that facilitates trade by eliminating the double coin-
cidence ofwants needed for barter.
The arguments for why banks mayor may not
have a "special" role in the current monetary sys-
tem can be best understood by considering the roles
ofbanks in alternative, simpler systems. Below, we
discuss banks' role in several types of monetary
systems to determine whether there is something
inherent in banks' monetary role that results in
market failures.
COmmodity Money
Perhaps the simplest monetary system is a com-
modity system in which a commodity such as gold
serves as the numeraire and circulates as the sole
medium of exchange. In such a system, the price
level is determined by the supply and demand
conditions for the numeraire commodity (for both
monetary and nonmonetary purposes) relative to
supply and demand conditions for other goods.
Although sucha monetary system(without banks
as providers of payment services) is more efficient
than a barter system, it is likely that it would be less
efficient than a system with bank-provided payment
services.4 Indeed, even in systems with a com-
modity numeraire, bank debt, either in the form of
privately issued banknotesordepositliabilities such
as checks, has served a role as a medium of
exchange.5
Oneeconomic function ofbanks in such asystem
is toeconomize on the real resource costs ofholding
and transferring the numeraire and thereby facilitate
trade by providing a financial medium ofexchange.
The question is whether there is some private mar-
ketfailure thatcharacterizes the private provisionof
a medium of exchange. In particular, will an unre-
gulatedbankingsystemleadto an infiniteprice level
and return to barter or a pure commodity system?
Based on Fama's (1980) research, the answer
appears to be no. Fama pointed out that in such a
commodity-based monetary system with privately
produced media ofexchange, the price level is still
determined by the supply and demand conditions
for the numeraire commodity relative to other
goods.6 In other words, the Walrasian determina-
tion ofequilibrium relative prices (in terms of the
numeraire) holds even in an economy in which debt
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(or other financial assets) is used to facilitate
exchange.
Thus, the quantity of debt, or other financial
assets that serves as a medium of exchange and is
used for payment purposes, does not directly affect
the price level. In a commodity system, the price
level is determined by the supply ofand demand for
the nmneraire commodity (not debt7), banks do not
create money in the sense ofcreating the numeraire
(eventhough they might issuetheirown banknotes),
and no restrictions are needed for price level deter-
minacy.
With a commodity monetary standard, there
remains the issue of price stability. Unanticipated
changes in the supply ofthe commodity (for exam-
ple, gold discoveries) or changes in the nonmone-
tary demand (for example, the invention of printed
circuit boards that require gold connectors) would
affect the price level. However, changes in relative
prices caused by changes in real demand or supply
conditions are not nonpecuniary externalities.
Moreover, since this type of instability has nothing
to do with the banking system it seems unlikely that
any sort of banking regulation could eliminate it.
This is not to say that a commodity with stable
nonmonetary supply and demand conditions, and
therefore a stable price, would not be preferable to
one with a fluctuating price. Both lower computa-
tion costs involved in current exchange and a
reduced degree ofrisk in future exchange may favor
such a commodity.
Changes in the monetary demand for the com-
modity also would cause the price level to change.
Even though a decline in the banking sector might
increase the demand for the numeraire commodity
as a mediumofexchange (and thus lead to a decline
in the price level), such an effectdoes not constitute
a nonpecuniary externality if the decline in banks'
ability to producemedia ofexchange is caused by an
increase in their real costs ofproduction.
An increased monetary demand for the com-
modity might, however, be caused by a "banking
panic." And if banking panics themselves result
from a market failure, some form ofbanking regula-
tion thateliminatedpanics mightenhanceefficiency
by reducing the waste involved in actually using a
commodity as a medium of exchange (that is, by
reducing the amount of financial intermediation).Such panics might also imposecosts by disrupting a
competitive payments system. We discuss these
possibilities in more detail later in this section.
Thus, aside from the possibilityofbanking panics
or runs, no private market failures appear to· be
associated with the workings ofacommodity-based
monetary system in which payment services are
competitively provided by banks. The only sort of
regulation that might be warranted would be regula-
tion that defined which commodity would be the
numeraire, although private market forces histor-
ically appear to have been able to make that deter-
mination.
Fiat Money
Since virtually all modern economies have
moved away from commodity standards to pure fiat
money, we now discuss whether banks' behavior
may be ofgreaterpublic policyconcern in apurefiat
system. In a pure fiat system, pieces of paper that
(I) have no intrinsic value, (2) are not redeemable
from the issuer for real goods, and (3) do not pay
interest typically serve as both the numeraire and
circulate as a medium ofexchange. Compared to a
commodity-based system in which the commodity
circulates as the medium ofexchange, a fiat system
may be more efficient because it does not divert a
real resource from nonmonetary uses to be used as a
medium of exchange. However, it may be possible
to have a commodity-based system in which the
commodity itselfdoes not circulate. In thatcase, itis
unclear whether a fiat system would be more effi-
dent. Nevertheless, a fiat system does differ impor-
tantly from a commodity based system in that it
makes the social control ofmoney, prices and credit
possible, and it provides a source oftax revenue.
A workable fiat money system, however, cannot
be provided by a competitive private market.
Assuming there initially would be a demand for
privately produced fiat moneyS, and that all fiat
money had the same unit of account (for example,
dollars), each private producerwould have an incen-
tive to expand the quantity of money it issued as
long as the money's marginal value exceeded its
marginal cost (assumed to be zero). Each producer,
however, would not take into account the negative
externalities of its fiat money issuance, namely, a
reduction of the real value of the money stocks of
other private producers and holders of fiat money.
59
The equilibrium private market solution would be a
fiat moneyofzero value. A fiat money with no value,
ofcourse, cannot serve as a numeraire ora medium
ofexchange. Since the public could be expected to
anticipate this equilibrium solution, there would be
no initial demand for a competitively produced fiat
currency.
The common solution to this problem is for the
government to sanction or to be itself a monopoly
supplier offiat currency, and to use various regula-
tory techniques to create and enhance the demand
for it. Although a monopoly supplier does not face
any inherent technical problems .in limiting the
supply of fiat currency, it may face political prob-
lems in doing so. A numberofcountries, apparently
unable to raise tax revenues from other sources,
have increased their rates of monetary expansion
with the result of hyperinflation. Under such cir-
cumstances, governments are often unsuccessful in
maintaining a demand for their currency and their
fiat systems have collapsed. Commodities or for-
eign currencies oftendo begin to circulate in econo-
mies with rampant inflation. Nevertheless, the rela-
tive success of fiat systems in many developed
countries suggests that governments in general can
maintain a demand for theircurrencyas long as they
also limit its supply.
In practice, there have been two common
methods of creating or enhancing the demand for
fiat currency: reserve requirements and the prohibi-
tion ofthe private issuance ofhand-to-handcirculat-
ing media ofexchange (for example, private bank-
notes). Reserve requirements create a demand
directly, by requiring banks to hold fiat money, as
well as indirectly, by taxing a substitute financial
medium of exchange. Prohibiting the private issu-
ance of banknotes prevents them from competing
with government currency as a medium of
exchange, and thus is equivalentto a 100 percenttax
on a substitute medium ofexchange.
Reserve requirements increase the demand for fiat
currency, but there probably wouldbe some demand
for fiat currency even in their absence. Fama (1983)
has argued that there probably is an inherent
demand for a zero-interest circulating medium of
exchange because of its convenience in facilitating
small transactions. However, absent reserve require-
ments, there still might be a need for regulations to
prevent the issuance of private banknotes. Eventhough privately issued banknotes are not a type of
fiat money (or numeraire) they would likely be a
close substituteforgovernmentcurrencyfor use as a
hand-to-hand circulating medium of exchange
becausethey would have convenience features simi-
lar to government currency. This substitutability,
however, could make the demand for government-
issuedcurrencyunstable and therefore make itdiffi-
cult to maintain a stable price level.
Finally, it seems possible that iftechnology con-
tinues to lower-the cost of bank-provided payment
mechanisms, such as electronic payments and
checks, the demand for currency as a medium of
exchange would decline. Monetary authorities
would then have to offset the decline to stabilize the
price level. Itis even conceivablethat in the future if
rapid technological change occurs, the demand for
currency (for domestic legal monetary purposes at
least) couldapproach zero and lead to acollapseofa
reserve-free fiat system.
For whatever reason, reserve requirements are a
feature of virtually all fiat systems. To enforce
reserve requirements, it is necessary to restrict the
sorts offinancial assets that can be used in transac-
tions as media ofexchange to those that are reserv-
able. As Black (1970, 1975) and Fama (1980) have
pointed out, in an unregulated banking system, as
long as there is a well-defined numeraire, virtually
all assets (in principle at least) could be used as
media ofexchange.9 Thus, nonreservable financial
assets could be used as media of exchange to cir-
cumvent, at least partially, reserve requirements.
Without regulations limiting which assets could be
used as media of exchange, the degree of circum-
vention would depend onlyonthe substitutabilityof
nonreservable assets in exchange.
In sum, a fiat money system may require some
degree of banking regulation. However, it is not
certain whether a fiat system, in which the numer-
aire is sociallycontrolled and the mediaofexchange
are regulated, is superior on microeconomic effi-
ciency grounds to a commodity-based system in
which a privately suppliedcommodity serves as the
numeraire and the media of exchange also are
supplied privately without government interven-
tion. lO
Even ifa fiat system were not more efficient than
a commodity-based system from a microeconomic
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standpoint, ithas several distinguishingcharacteris-
tics that may account for its almost universal adop-
tion. First, the supplier of fiat money ("base
money" in the U.S.) can raise revenue directly by
issuing more money. Second, by varying the quan-
tity of base or fiat money or by varying reserve
requirements, the supplier can influence the price
level. And third, in a fiat system with reserve
requirements, the degree offinancial intermediation
(and possibly, real interest rates) can be influenced
by·varying reserve requirements or the quantity of
reserves.
Regarding this third point, an increase in reserve
requirements lowers the amount of financial inter-
mediation, and this, in tum, may increase real
interest rates by reducing the supply ofcredit. It is
not possible, however, to increase the degree of
financial intermediation beyond what would occur
in an unregulated market. Althoughreserve require-
ments enable the social control of the degree of
financial intermediation, they do so by increasing
the costoffinancial intermediation and are therefore
a source of economic inefficiency from a micro-
economic standpoint.
It seems likely that these characteristics of a fiat
system are more important than any potential
advantages in efficiency such a system might have
over a commodity-based monetary system. If so,
from a social welfare perspective, support for a fiat
system with reserve requirements over, say, a com-
modity-based monetary system would seem to be
based on the assumption that there are social bene-
fits to government control of money and credit
intermediation. The market failure implied by this
perspective is that the macroeconomy, in the
absence of government intervention regarding the
money supply, would not have the desired stability
in prices, credit intermediation, and economic
activity. In pointing this out, we do not contribute to
the debate about whether (discretionary) mac-
roeconomic stabilization by the monetary
authorities is eitherpossible ora socially legitimate
role ofgovernment. We merely note that ifit were a
goal, then some form ofregulation would be neces-
sary. The degree of regulation needed for these
purposes is quite limited, however. It consists of
restrictions on the private issuance of base money,
limitations onthe private issuance ofassets that canbe used as media ofexchange, and reserve require-
ments on assets that are used as media ofexchange.
Banks as Credit Intermediaries
Aside from their roles in the monetary system,
banks are involved in providing credit intermedia-
tion services. Ascredit intermediaries, banks gener-
ally hold a large volume ofnontraded assets (loans).
One reason these assets are not traded is that banks
have specialized information about them that other
market participants do not.
One study that attempted to establish that this
aspect of credit intermediation by banks makes
them special is Bernanke (1983). Because banks
have specialized information, Bernanke argues that
a disruption ofthe credit intermediation services of
banks is possible and that such a disruption can be
very costly to the economy. II
Bernanke's specific thesis is that the loss ofbank
internlediation services in the 1930s contributed
significantly to the length and severity of the
Depression. One obvious reason for the loss of
credit intermediation services was the large number
of bank failures .12 But Bernanke argues that, even
without failures, intermediation costs could rise if
banks adjust their allocation of funds to head off
depositor runs. That is, depositories could shift to
"safe" assets such as Treasuries, that can be evalu-
ated easily by the market. Sucha "flightto quality"
by banks could result in a reduction ofthe extension
of new credit to the private sector and adversely
affect the economy by contributing to a contraction
in production.
Consistent with the framework of our analysis,
suchan increase inintermediationcosts should beof
public policy concern only ifit constitutes an exter-
nality. However, higher intermediation costs could
come about without external effects. One pos-
sibility is that the disruption ofthe banking system
and the resulting higher intermediation costs come
about because of an actual change in the economic
environment that reduces or even eliminates the
value ofthe information depositories have concern-
ing borrowers. The Great Depression is a case in
point. Information on the pastbehaviorofborrowers
would not have been extremely valuable to deposi-
tories in distinguishing the risks associated with
lending to different customers during the 1930s.
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Furthermore, it might have been more costly for
banks to evaluate the riskiness ofnew loans with a
given level of confidence when the economic
environmentwas changing so drastically.
To the extent that higher intermediation costs
result from increased difficulty in evaluating bor-
rowers, it is unlikely that public policy (greater
regulatory or supervisory intervention) could help.
Regulatory agencies could not be expected to hold
any particular advantage over commercial banks in
evaluating borrowers. Therefore, even federal
deposit insurance might not be sufficient to affect
banks' investment decisions. That is, even if the
administration of deposit insurance accounted for
the riskiness of a bank's assets as perceived by the
insurance agency (which presumably would not
have an advantage over banks in estimating risk),
banks would not necessarily be less likely to shift
into "safe" a<;sets. In an environment that induces
flight to quality, it might be true that some "good"
borrowers would not be able to obtain credit - a
problem in the 1930s cited by Bernanke. These
would be good borrowers to the extent that, if the
banks and depositors could obtain information cost-
lessly about the true risk, credit would be extended.
But, information is not costless and it is unclear
whether public-policy measures (regulation) could
reduce its cost in this case.
Alternatively, the banking industry may be dis-
rupted not by an economic shock that changes the
quality ofbankassets orthe abilityofbanks tojudge
the riskiness of borrowers but by a change in the
public's perception of banks. In this case, the
"inside" information possessed by banks is not
transferred to depositors. This may be the situation
to which Bernanke referred. Banks are aware of
profitable loan alternatives but are unable to con-
vince depositors, or, with the same result, unwilling
to compensate depositors for the risk that they
misperceive. This could be interpreted as there
being "good" borrowers that were unable to obtain
credit because ofthe public's misperceptions.
Why would the relevant information not be pro-
duced by the market? One answer, suggested by
Lelandand Pyle (1977), is thatmoral hazardhinders
the transfer of information between market partici-
pants. That is, banks have an incentive to overstate
the qualityoftheirportfolios. This is especially trueif verifying· banks' claims (information) is very
costly. One solution to the moral hazard problem,
suggested by Leland and Pyle, is for firms' man-
agers to use theirwillingness to invest in aproject as
a signal to the market of the true quality of that
project. This strategy would seem most useful for
owner-managed firms. However, when ownership
and control are separate, bank managers with spe-
cialized information may face a similar problem
convincing potential shareholders.
The moral hazard problem could be circum-
vented if the relevant information were collected
(and if necessary transferred) by disinterested par-
ties - those that would not benefit from making
biased evaluations of banks. Depositors constitute
one set ofcandidates, but the usual assumption is
that it is too costly for individual depositors to
collect the information. A third party could acquire
information on banks and sen it to depositors (or
even bank shareholders). However, given the nature
ofinformation as a public good and the inability to
prevent information from being resold, a private
information agency might not be able to "force" all
users to pay. In contrast, government regulatory
agencies should not encounter this problem.
Alternatively, depositors might be willing to
accept an arrangement whereby banks paid a third
party directly for providing information on, say,
loan quality. It might be noted that private rating
agencies do currently collect and disseminate infor-
mation on the debt quality of a wide variety of
issuers, although it is not certain how well this
would work for banks. Therefore some government
role might be consistent with public policy that
addresses the moral hazard problem in the genera-
tion ofinformation on banks.
In practice, U.S. regulatory agencies currently
gather information but do not provide it to deposi-
tors. 13 They also enforce regulations that control
bank behavior instead ofleaving the task to liability
holders. This dual role does not follow directly from
the information-deficiency argument, and would
have to be rationalized on some otherbasis, such as
the provision offederal deposit insurance which is
discussedlater.
Bank Stability
The discussion above raises the possibility that
market failures in the workings of the monetary
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sy~tem and credit market may be a basis for some
puhlicpolicy measures such as reserve require-
ments, prohibitions against the private issuance ofa
hand-to-hand circulating medium ofexchange, and
governmentprovisionofinformation on banks. The
susceptibility of banks to runs, which themselves
may be related to market failures, also may be a
source ofpublic policy concern.
As S1Jggestedearlier, banks' roles in the monetary
system may justify concern over the stability of the
banking system. One reason is that disruptions to
the banking system might impair the ability of a
central bank ina fiat system to conduct monetary
policy. 14 For.example, a loss of public confidence
(and the resulting instability) in the institutions
whose liabilities are reservable could make the
demand for base money (the numeraire) unstable. It
likely could make it difficult, ifnot impossible, for
the monetary authorities to take offsetting actions
involving reserves to stabilize the price level and
economic activity. IS Also, a central bank would be
unable to control shifts into currency and out of
deposit accounts completely. Such shifts might
cause large economic losses because currency and
deposits are not good substitutes. In addition, Dia-
mondand Dybvig (1981), as well as Bernanke,
argue that bank runs imposereal costs by disrupting
credit intermediation and reducing production.
Assessing Banks Runs
A number of studies present models that explain
why banks are vulnerable to runs. Auseful example
is Diamond and Dybvig. In their model, banks add
value by transforming illiquid assets into liquid
assets. They provide a kind of "insurance" for
consumers, who are uncertain as to the timing of
their consumption and, therefore, when they will
need to tap their illiquid resources. An important
characteristic ofthe transformation banks provide is
that banks fund their illiquid assets with par-value
liquiddeposits. 16
The. uncertain timing of consumption makes the
volume of withdrawals uncertain for banks. As a
result, banks may not hold enough reserves to cover
depositoutflows, and may have to undertake what is
ass.umed to be acostly liquidationofassets. Deposi-
tors trying to avoid sharing in the resulting losses
run on banks in such situations. In the Diamond andDybvig world, bank runs impose real costs on the
economy because they disruptcredit intermediation
and·output. And depositors making withdrawals
beyond the volume expected by banks·(beyond the
amount of reserves held by banks) •impose social
costs on other depositors.
In identifying the source of the market failures
associated with bankrullS, we note thatexternalities
can arise when there are poorly·defined property
rights. This is what occurs with liquid par-valued
deposits when banks incur losses that exceed net
worth. The situationis analogousto theproblemofa
communal good. Inthat case, resources are used up
"too" quickly as individuals attempt to convert the
communal good to a private good. Similarly, with
par-valued deposits, depositors have a fixed claim
onapool ofassets. When depositors believe thatthe
value of the assets is less than the par value ofthe
fixed claims and the bank remains open, depositors'
property rights are not protected. Accordingly,
depositors act on their incentives to convert the
communal pool of assets to private assets by with-
drawing funds: they run on the bank.
The par-value feature ofdeposit contracts results
in poorly defined (or poorly protected) property
rights which can lead to externalities and expose
individual institutions to runs. With par-value
deposits, therefore, even arun on an individual bank
can involve a market failure.
The more traditional concern with bank runs has
been whether the banking system as a whole is
vulnerable to panics. The Diamond and Dybvig
model can provide little guidance on that question.
Their model includes elements that make a run on
one bank possible, but a systemwide run unlikely.
Runsin theirmodelare possiblebecausethe volume
of withdrawals is uncertain. However, with a very
large number of depositors, the withdrawals from
the banking system should be predictable with a
smallerror. Ifthere were a numberofbanks, instead
of one as in the Diamond and Dybvig model,the
predictionerrors forindividual institutions would be
larger. Even this complication should not be impor-
tant since the free trading ofbankassets, which are
not risky (no default risk) in the Diamond and
Dybvig model, would effectively pool systemwide
reserves.
The problem of bank runs, however, involves
more than bank liquidity and the predictability of
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deposit withdrawals. Bank portfoliOS are risky, and
abankcansustainsufficientlylargelossesas aresult
ofcredit and interest rate risk to generate a run.
With individual institutions susceptible to runs
because>of risky portfolios,the system as a whole
also couldbe unstable ifthe value ofbank assets is
frequently reduced by common exogenousfactors.
Kindleberger (l985) makes exactlythis point. He
indicatesthatexogenousmacroshocks were the
predominant causes of bank failures inthe 1920s
and 1930s. Exogenous macro shocks such as the
strength ofthe dollar, the unexpected dropininfla-
tion and relative price changes (such as declinesin
oil prices) are again at the core ofthe problems of
many failed and weakened banks in the 1980s. To
the extent that such macro shocks stem from unex-
pected changes in fiscal and monetary policy, they
represent the external effects ofgovernment activity
on the private economy.
Anotherreason that the bankingsystemgenerally
is depicted as being susceptible to instability is that
the failure of one bank increases the probability of
runs at other banks. Such "contagion" effects, if
they exist, would represent a classic example of
externalities. The existence of contagion effects in
banking, however, has not been substantiated by
post-Depression empirical work. This lack of
empirical support may be due to the presence of
deposit insurance, but other evidence indicates that
depositors are able to distinguish, to some degree,
safeinstitutionsfrom unsafe ones. Beebe (1985), for
example, argues that the behavior of large bank
holding companies' stock prices indicates that the
market is able to make distinctions amollg holding
companies on the basis of factors affecting the
quality of their individual portfolios. In addition,
Rolnick and Weber (1983) raise doubts that the
evidence from the free-banking era supports the
presence ofcontagion effects in banking.
Policy Responses
Whethercontagioneffects ormacroshocksdeter-
mine the .potential for systemwide instability· in
banking, the vulnerability ofbanks toruns remains
a problem.of property rights. That problem isa
function ofthree factors - par-value accounts, risk
inbanking, and the liquidityofdeposits. The incen-
tive to run on banks can be removed by muting theadv~rse side effects ofanyone ofthe three compo-
nents.
Par~Value Accounts
Thepar-valuefeature ofdeposits could be elimi-
nat~d.byconverting depositors to equity holders, as
are money market mutual fund shareholders. In a
world of complet~markets and no unc~rtainty, this
change would not pose problems since banks, as
wellas other firms, would be indifferent to the mix
of~quity anddebtfinancing. Butthat is notthe state
ofth~world; ifit were, there probably would be no
role for banks as intermediaries.
Itseems likely that the economic contribution of
banks as integrated providers of transaction and
intermediation services would be affected adversely
by a complete regulatory abolishment of par-value
deposit accounts. Even before the Glass-Steagal
Act, banks offered par-value deposit contracts. In
part, this practice likely is due to the problem of
d~terminingthe market value ofmany bank assets.
In addition, the public may have a preference for
par-value bankaccounts for transactions needs since
there may be some advantage to having a predict-
able account balance when planning purchases.
It is difficult to evaluate the importance of par-
valueliquid deposits to banking. The shift ofmany
money market mutual funds from marked-to-mar-
ket to amortized cost accounting, which results in
quasi-parvalueaccounts, suggests thatthere may be
ademand for predictable balances for certain types
Of accounts. Nev~rtheless, the use ofnonpar-value
accounts for liquid deposits by banks would elimi-
nate the incentives for bank runs. To the extent that
bankruns are apublic policyconcern, regulation, at
a minimum, should not prevent the development of
nonpar-value accounts by banks.
Risk in Banking
Asidefrom par-value accounts, anothercondition
for bank runs is that banks be exposed to risk. One
way ofpreventing bank runs would to be eliminate
riskin banks' portfolios - credit risk as well as
interest rate risk. This would mean that bank assets
would have to befree ofdefault risk, and asset and
liability durations would have to be matched.
To eliminate risk in banking, the structure of
banking would have to be radically altered. Banks
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would .. not be allowed to hold commercial and
industriaUoans,consumer loans, mortgage loans,
etc; but banks might still be able to originate loans
andthensell them. Such stringentregulation would
s~Ytet~lynarrow th~ ~conomicfunction ofbanks. A
policy, for example, that made banks hold only
liquidand riskless assets would make it impossible
for banks•to perform what Diamond and Dybvig
argu.eis ak~y function - transformation ofilliquid
assets to liquid assets.
Public policy toward banks as currently struc-
turedcan be viewed as a compromise between
eliminating the riskiness of banks and maintaining
their economic functions. Yet much present bank
regulation has beenjustified as necessa~y to control
risk in banking, and thereby to enhance stability.
These so-called safety-and-soundness regulations
include restrictions on activities, capital require-
ments and anticompetitive measures, such as limits
on entry. l3elow, we discuss these regulations.
Restrictions on Activities
From a safety-and-soundness perspective, the
usual arguments for limiting the economic activities
of banks is that some activities, such as insurance
und~rwriting and direct real estate investment, are
considered highly risky. Furthermore, gains from
diversification are viewed as unable to offset the
risks these activities present. Limiting banks'
activities, it is argued, would lower the institutions'
risk-return positions.
There is considerable debate, however, over
whether regulation can lower the risk-return posi-
tion, and even whetherregulation is counte~roduc­
tive. To increase their return on equity, institutions
might simply raise their risk exposure in permitted
activities. Alternatively, banks, if allowed, might
increase theirleverage to re-establish a desired risk-
retumposition. Moreover, regulations that limit the
abilityofinstitutionstodiversifymay exacerbatethe
problem ofinstability, by reducing returns without
lowering risk. 17
CapitalRequirements
Capital requirements also have been justified on
safety-and-soundness grounds. In the absence of
regulation, banks could be expected to hold some
level of capital, if only to increase the probabilitythatthey couldmakegoodonnoncontingentdeposit
claims held against them. The questionfacing pol-
icy makers is whether market-detennined·capital
"requirements" for banks would be adequate.
TotheextentthatpublicPQlicy regatdingbanksis
based on the existence of market failures, the
amount of capital demanded by the market would
not be adequate. Moreover, in the present environ-
ment, the subsidized rateonfedetal·insllraricedis-
torts theequity-depositmixthatwouldbedemanded
by the market by reducing the need for equity. We
discuss the issue of federal deposit insurance more
fully in the next section.
AnticompetitionRegulations
In addition to portfolio constraints, the risk-
return position ofbanks might be affected by anti-
competition regulations such as entry restrictions.
Entry restrictions are widespread in banking and
include prohibitions on de novo entry through char-
tering regulations, as well as restrictions on branch-
ing, chain bankingand interstate banking, although
many ofthese appear to be breaking down (Keeley,
1985).
The primary effect of limiting entry is to create
rents by restricting competition. The directeffect of
entry restrictions (or any other anticompetitive reg-
ulation for that matter), then, would be to create a
market failure - not to rectify one. By limiting
competition, however, bank charters (the right to do
business) have a capital value that would notexistin
the absence of regulation. Moreover, this capital,
unlike most assets, cannot be separated from the
bank. It would appear, therefore, from a market-
failure point of view, that the only justification for
entry restrictions would be their usefulness as an
indirect way ofenforcing minimum capital require-
ments. I8 However, while this capital may provide
some cushion, particularly for the depositinsurance
agencies in the event of a failure,direct capital
regulation could achieve the same result without the
distorting influence ofrestricted competition.
To the extent that public policyconcerning banks
is based on the presence ofcertain market failures,
capital requirements, linked with monitoring of
risk-taking might be appropriate in principle.
However, absent easily enforced restrictions that
allow banks to invest only in riskless assets - a
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practice that would eliminatemostofthe economic
functions of banks, there remains the question of
whetherregulation can ensure sufficientstability in
financial markets to avoid disruptions to monetary
c()IltrOl,.thepayment system, .and· creditlllarkets.
Depository institutions have incentives to circum-
vent regulatory constraints to improve their risk-
return positions. But perhaps moreiInportarltly,
much·of the instability in banking appears·to have
stemmed from macroeconomic shocks.· As long as
banks•maintain risky portfolios,.it is doubtful that
supervision and regulation can insulate banks from
such shocks.
DepOsit Liquidity
The third component in the bank run problem is
deposit liquidity. Without ready access to their
funds, depositors would not be able to act on their
desire to avoid losses. One innovation that often is
argued to neutralize the problems associated with
liquid deposits is the existence of a lender-of-Iast-
resort. A central bank, acting as lender-of-Iast-
resort, is said to be able to prevent runs without
limiting the liquidity of deposits by providing a
market for bank assets.
By acting as a sourceofliquidity, a lender-of-Iast-
resort couldindeedpreventrunsiftheonlysourceof
losses for banks were unexpected assetliquidations,
and if the lender-of-Iast-resort could significantly
reduce the cost of such liquidations. As suggested
earlier, however, banks are exposed to losses from a
varietyofsources, notall ofwhichcanbecontrolled
by a lender-of-Iast-resort. Ifthe lender-of-Iast-resort
is required to mark bank assets to market, as is the
case for the Federal Reserve, then losses related to,
say, credit risk could be sufficient to prompt a run.
That is, a lender-of-Iast-resort that marks-to-Illarket
does notfully address the propertyrights problemof
liquid par-value accounts.
Diamond and Dybvig offer another approach for
maintaining property rights when deposits are liq-
uid. Their solution suggests that it is not necessary
to deny depositors access to their funds to prevent
runs. Instead, it is only necessary to preventdeposi-
tors from avoiding any liability when they do with-
draw their funds. Runs are prevented in their model
through the threat of an ex post levy on all deposi-
tors. This levy would meet deposit obligations at aban.1e in the event of greater-than-expected with-
drawals.. Depositors do not have an incentive to
withdraw their funds prematurely since, with the
threatofanex postlevy, they would be no betteroff
iHherewerearun, an.dthey wouldbe.worse.off if
thereivvere no run (for example, depositors making
withdrawals might forgo interest income and incur
othertransactions costs).
I)nderc1.]J'tentpolicy measures related to bank-
ing, depositors'. claims are.secured through the
systeluoffed.eraldepositinsurance. The administra-
tion of federal deposit insurance parallels the
approach suggested by Diamond and Dybvig to
some degree. While the insurance agencies main-
tainfunds, the effectivenessoffederaldepositinsur-
ance lies in the understanding that the full faith and
credit ofthe federal government stands behind the
insurance funds. That is, the viability ofthe insur-
ance funds rests on the taxing authority of the
government. The ability to levy taxes to meet
depositwithdrawals is similar to the ex postfees on
depo~itorsin the Diamond and Dybvig model.
Despite this similarity, the current deposit insur-
anCe system is quite different from the solution
suggested by Diamond and Dybvig. While federal
deposit insurance maintains well-defined property
rightsfor insured depositors, it also involves pool-
inguonsystematic risk in banking. 19 This second
aspect of federal deposit insurance raises the con-
cern that the current insurance system generates
distortions in the economy by creating incentives
for depository institutions to take on nondiversifi-
able or systemic risk. 20 These incentives for risk-
taking arise because the value ofthe insuranceis not
reflected in the cost offunds to individual banks.
The ex post levy in the Diamond and Dybvig
mo(lel does. not distort incentives for risk-taking
even ifbankassets are risky. In their model, there is
only one bank and depositors know they must
ultim<itely bearapro rata share oflosses .that might
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resultfromthe bank's risk-taking. There is no risk-
pooling, onlythe enforcement of property rights.
l)epositors.would consider risk-exposure in.deter-
mining their expected rate ofreturn on deposits, so
the costofdepositstothe bankwould be positively
related to the risk of its portfolio. Asa result, the
cost ofbank risk-taking would be internalized.
A system for preventing runs more in keeping
withthes()lution suggested by Diamond and Dyb-
vigwould enforce property rights without govern-
ment-provided insurance..With many banks in the
system, onewayto accomplishthis wouldbeto hold
depositors, both past and present, liable for the
losses ofa failed bank and not the insurance funds
andthe general public. Forpastdepositorsto remain
at risk, depositor liability would have to extend
beyond the time when funds are withdrawn.
As a practical matter, a working definition of
whatconstitutes a "pastdepositor" would be neces-
sary and probably only the government could
enforce an ex post levy on such depositors. Nev-
ertheless, such an alternative to the current deposit
insurance would have the effect of making deposi-
tors sensitive to bank risk. This is similar to the goal
ofdeposit insurance reforms that stress increasing
market discipline, but unlike them, it would still
prevent bank runs. 21
Such a system would take the government out of
the deposit insurance business but keep it in the
property rights enforcement business. At the same
time, depositors would have an added incentive to
optimally diversify their portfolios. Moreover, the
program suggested to prevent runs would not pre-
clude, and could even facilitate, the provision of
private deposit insurance that took advantage of
pooling nonsystemic risk in banking. If private
insurance were not available, it would even be
possible to have some nominal federal coverage for
small depositors considered unable to take advan-
tage of diversification. Such protection would not
distort bank behavior.UI. Summary and>Conclusion
The debate overthe role ofgovernmentin regulat-
ing depository institutionsundollbtedly will con-
tinue. Although the debate in the political arena is
partly about the distributive effects ofregulation,
regulation's social benefits and costs also can be
important considerations from even a purely private
interest. perspective. We have ther~fore examined
how banking regulation might be related to social
welfare. This would seem to be anecessary first step
in a more complete studythat would also look at
regulation from the viewpoint of private interests.
Examining the distributive effects of banking reg-
ulation is, however, left for future research.
Our approach has been to determine whether
there is a potential for market failures in banking as
it relates to the monetary and credit systems. With
regard to the monetary system, an unrestricted,
competitive, private fiat system is not viable. A fiat
monetary system requires control overthe supply of
money (the numeraire) and a demand for the fiat
money. One way to ensure a demandis by imposing
reserve requirements, although, if there were a
stable demand for a fiat currency for transaction
purposes, reserve requirements would not be neces-
sary. Reserve requirements, however, make possible
the social control of the degree of financial inter-
mediation, but at a cost of restricting it to be less
than it would be under a reserve-free system. In a
monetary system where reserve requirements are
used, it may be necessary to limit the types of
privately issued assets used as media ofexchange to
enforce reserve requirements.
In providing credit, banks hold a large volume of
nontraded assets (loans). The asymmetry in infor-
mation of banks and the public concerning the
quality ofbank assets could inhibit the intennedia-
tion process. This situation, however, is not unique
to depositories, but is shared by other private
placers ofcredit, such as finance companies and life
insurers. The problem of deficient information
would seem to imply, at most, a need to collect and
disseminate information services the market
might not be able to supply.
Where there may be a public policy concern
regarding the credit system is the stability ofbank-
ing. The stability question is also important to
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banks' role in the. monetary system. Forexample, to
the extent that the demand for fiat money is derived
from. reserve. requirements, •thestability ..ofthe
institutions on which the requirements are imposed
becomes important. Moreover, even in a system
without reserve requirements, the stability (predict-
ability) of the. demand for money (del11and for the
numeraire) is related to the stability ofthe demand
for bank-produced paymentservices.. Forbanks(all
depository institutions), the issue of stability is
particularly important given their vulnerability to
macroeconomic shocks and runs.
The problem of runs can be traced to banks'
reliance on par-valued liquid liabilities which they
use to fund risky assets. When the market value ofa
bank's assets are thought to be less than its lia-
bilities, the poorly defined, or at least unenforce-
able, property rights of the deposit holders to the
pool ofassetS can cause depositors to run. Property
rights can be maintained through the use ofnonpar-
value or marked-to-market contracts. The full eco-
nomic implications of"forcing" the use ofnon-par-
value liquid accounts are notclear, butpublic policy
should at least not inhibit their development.
Other public policy measures to ensure bank
stability, such as safety-and-soundness regulation
and lender-of-Iast-resort, Can play roles in reducing
the probability of a bank run, but they do not fully
address the problem of property rights in deposit
contracts. Deposit insurance, in contrast, can in
principle protect property rights.
To prevent runs, a deposit insurance system does
not rely solely on a reserve fund; it also relies on its
ability to impose expostlevies. The effectiveness of
a deposit insurance system depends on depositors'
confidence in the ability and willingness of the
system to impose such fees. In this regard, agovern-
ment agency might be viewed as more effective than
a private finn. Some government responsibility in
the provision of deposit insurance might also have
the effect of internalizing within the government
sector the cost ofmacro shocks related to fiscal and
monetary policy
The benefits offederal deposit insurance have not
come without a price. As it is currently admin-istered, the system raises a number of regulatory
issues regarding the incentives it provides for risk-
taking. Indeed, much of the current debate over
traditional safety-and-soundness issues is cast in
teflllsOftheseincentivesandtheriskexposureofthe
insurancefunds. Atbest, safety-and-soundness reg-
ulation and risk-related deposit insurance premia
willbe only partially successful in checking bank
risk-taking 'and limiting the inefficiency due to
deposit insurance. The insurance itself likely will
continue to distort bank behaviorbecause the losses
ofan individual bank remain liabilities ofthe insur-
ancefundsandthegeneral taxpaying public and not
the liabilities of,the shareholders and depositors of
individual banks.
The question ofhow government intervention in
bankingrelates tothepublic interestwill continueto
be a controversial one. Ourcontribution has been to
focusthe debate, on market failures, partly because
economists generally believe that market failures
aretheOnly "appropriate" reason for regulation and
partly because understanding the nature of these
failures is anecessary first step in understanding the
possible distributive aspects ofregulation.
FOOTNOTES
1. In fact, many analyses of the effects of regulations on
the banking industry (see Dothan and Williams, 1980, and
Kareken and Wallace, 1978) have used modelsof banks in
which there are no market failures. The conclusion from
such models is that no regulation is best. These analyses
would seem to be of little practical use, however, because
their conclusions follow directly from their assumptions. In
contrast, our approach tries to determine first whether
there might be market failures associated with banking
activities.
2. There is now a literature in economics that at least
partiallyvalidates this private interestview. A large number
of regulations in the airline, automotive, steel, financial,
trucking, agricultural, and communication industries have
beehshown to be primarily attempts to restrict competi-
tion. Although these sorts of anticompetitive regulations
did not serve any discernible public interest goal in terms
of rectifying market failures, they probably did redistribute
income.
3. 8ecker's model also relates to the impact of dead-
weight losses stemming from regulations that are primarily
intended to redistribute wealth. He shows that an increase
in the deadweight cost of a subsidy reduces political
pressure from the subsidized group because a given
expenditure results in a smaller net benefit to them. Sim-
ilarly, an increase in the deadweight cost of a tax leads to
greater pressure by taxpayers to reduce taxes because a
given reduction in theirtax rates has a smaller effect on the
revenues produced.
4. One reason is that in a pure commodity system the
monetary demand for the commodity (to effect trade) will
lead tomereproductionofthe numeraire commodity com-
pared to a system in which the commodity is not held for
purposes of monetary exchange. Even if the commodity is
in fixed supply, sothat productionofthe commoditymoney
is. notaffected, the monetary demand for the commodity
will leadto its diversion from productive nonmonetary uses
for monetary uses. Thus, a commodity system in which the
commodity itself serves as the sole medium of exchange
wastes real resources compared to a system in which the
costs ofholdingthe commodityfor a monetarypurposeare
reduced by using other less costly mechanisms to effect
exchange.
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Moreover, physical transfers of the commodity needed to
carry out trade may be very costly compared to the use of
financial assets to effect trade through an accounting
system of exchange or through the use of banknotes. It
might be noted that a banking system with 100 percent
required reserves thus could beverycostly. Such a system
could be more efficient than a commodity system since it
might reduce the costs of physicallytransporting the com-
modity during exchange, but it would be less efficient than
a system in which the commodity was relatively freed from
monetaryuses.
5. We do not use the term "medium of exchange" neces-
sarily to denote an actual physical circulating medium
such as currency or banknotes. Instead, we use it to refer
to all bank-provided payment services including checks,
wire transfers, credit cards as well as private banknotes.
6. Although the economics of a commodity-based mone-
tary system with bank debt as one medium of exchange
were discussed by Adam Smith (1776), this part of the
monetary economics literature seems to have been
neglected until recently as exemplified in the workof Fama
(1980, 1983), Laidler (1981), Sargent and Wallace (1982),
Hall (1983), and White (1984).
7. However, there still might be a question of whether
regulation would be required tolimit the private issuanceof
media of exchange to ensure their continued usefulness.
One would expect that in such a commodity-based sys-
tem, competitive private market forces would require that
bank debt be redeemable in the numeraire commodity to
prevent banks from issuing too much debt. Without
redeemability, banksmight betempted to engage in Ponzi
schemes, redeeming old debt in terms of new debt. Credi-
tors ofbanks (forexample, depositors) mightnot be ableto
ascertain the actual financial condition of such banks
becauseofhigh information costs and incentives of banks
to overstate theirtrue financial conditions. Currently, to our
knowledge, all debt is redeemable for the numeraire,
although not necessarily on demand.
Competitionalsowould force banks to chargethe marginal
costs of operating such a system and to pay a market rate
of intereston debt, points often neglected bywriters on this
subject. The payment of interest on and redeemability ofbank debt would limit its issuance just as the payment of
interest on and redeemability of otherforms ofdebtlimit its
issuance.
8, Note that privately issued banknotes under a com-
modity system are not fiat money becausethey are notthe
numeraire, In fact, unlike fiat money, privately issued bank-
notes are redeemable for the numeraire commodity and
are financial assets (that is, bank liabilities),
9. This is not to say that some assets would not be used
more often than others to effect transactions. For example,
the transaction costs of trading with assets whose prices
are uncertain might be very high and thus limit their use in
mosttrades.
10. A Hat system may eliminate the holding of com-
modities for monetary purposes and thus free real
resources for otheruses, Even with a fiat system, however,
persons may hold commodities for monetary purposes.
Today, large quantities of gold appear to be held for such
purposes,
Moreover, a fiat system implicitly taxes the holders of fiat
money in proportion to their holdings. (The tax is the
foregone nominal interest associated with holding fiat
money.) This tax distorts behavior and leads persons to
hold less fiat money than is socially optimal. To achieve a
socially optimal quantity of fiat money holdings (see Fried-
man, 1969), interest must be paid on fiat (base) money
either directly or indirectly through deflation, and these
interest payments must be financed by a nondistorting tax
such asa head tax. Since private entities do not have the
power to tax, this is another reason the private sector
cannot produce a socially optimal fiat money system.
Furthermore, a private monopoly supplier would have no
incentive to provide the socially optimal quantity of fiat
money and would be likely to maximize the real revenue
from printing money instead, Thus, government regulation
of such a supplier could enhance efficiency,
11. This argument could apply to all private placers of
credit such as insurance companies and finance com-
panies.
12. Another reason for a decline in the level of financial
intermediation in the second halfofthe 1930s would be the
increase in reserve requirements that occurred in 1936
and 1937.
13. Information may not be made public because it is
believed that, with deposit insurance, which has effectively
covered all depositors, the public would not use the infor-
mation to monitor banks, Most recently, with the FDIC
looking for an increased role for market discipline, consid-
eration has been given to greater public disclosure of
information on banks.
14. As mentioned earlier, in acommodity-based monetary
system, a bank panic might also be a concern since it
could affect indirectly the demand for the numeraire and
thus, prices,
15, Even underan interest rate targeting procedure, a loss
of confidence in the banking system and a "flight to
quality" can pose problems for monetary policy, In the
1930s, for example, low rates on safe assets donot appear
to have sent the proper signal regarding whether the
Federal Reserve was providing sufficient liquidity
(reserves) to the economy, Also, with federal funds rate
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targeting, that rate could be affected byconcerns over the
stability of the banking system,
Finally, the traditional concern overstability in banking and
monetary control is that shifts from deposits to currency
could lead toamultiple contraction in the measured money
supply, such as Mi., becquseof.the systemoffra.ctional
reserves. Given the lessons that have been learned from
the past, it is likely that the Federal Reserve would be able
to maintain the level (or growth rate) of a predefined
aggregate such as M1, However, aconstant growth rate of
M1 might not ensure financial stability, and the. Federal
Reserve may be unable to predict accurately just how
much money (M1) it should supply to ensure stability.
16, In the Diamond and Dybvig model, banks are mutual
organizations in the sense that in the last time period any
residual above the guaranteed rate of return is shared by
surviving depositors.
17. Given these problems, controlling risk through super-
vision (monitoring and controlling risks) ratherthan restrict-
ing particular activities is an alternative, That is, to limit risk
it is more important to monitor and control how institutions
carry out various activities than it is to regulate which
activities they may pursue. One caveat is that the ability of
regulators to monitor a bank's riskiness may beaffected by
the variety of activities in which the institution is involved. In
addition some risky activities may be more difficult to
monitor than others even though they are not inherently
more risky. But it is not clear, apriori, which activities would
involve higher monitoring costs.
18, A similar argument could be made about interest rate
ceilings. That is, if they could be enforced by eliminating
nonprice competition and disintermediation, they also
would represent a restriction on competition that would not
appear to address any market failure but instead would
create one. Moreover, with nonprice competition, such
ceilings have the effect of increasing the marginal cost of
deposits while lowering the marginal return compared to
the competitive situation, thus creating a further distortion,
A traditional rationale for deposit rate ceilings is that unfet-
tered competition would drive up deposit rates and cause
banks to take on riskier portfolios, This view now seems
largely discredited because if banks could benefit from
riskier portfolios without deposit ceilings, why would they
not benefit from such activities with them?
Smith (1984) has argued that because depositors are
heterogeneous in terms of withdrawal probabilities and,
because the information is private, that bank runs and
instability might occur essentially because of adverse
selection. That is, while deposit ceilings do not affect the
risk of banks' asset portfolios, they can reduce the risk of
bank runs. However, his analysis, which views banks as
providers of insurance, is far from persuasive and raises
more issues than it settles, In particular, his conclusions
seem at odds with the wide variety of financial instruments
with different liquidities and maturities that are provided by
banks and other financial intermediaries, Moreover, it
seems possible that ceilings might lead to large dead-
weight losses for some types of depositors and even a
breakdown in intermediation altogether.
19, In the case of systemic risk, the current deposit insur-
ance system still serves to maintain depositors' property
rights and, as SUCh, is more in keeping with the Diamondand Dybvig prototype. One difference between the two
systems is that there would be some redistribution of
wealth with the current system since taxes would not likely
be based on individuals' deposit holdings.
20. See Darby (1986).
21. Thereareanumberofproposals forIncreasing market
discipline in banking to reduce the distortions associated
with deposit insurance. These include lowering the statu-
tory maximum insurance limit as well as permitting coin-
surance, which would mean that only a fraction of the
depositors' balanceswould becovered.
The modified payout plan is another example of how the
deposit insurance agencies mightseekto increase market
discipline. The modified payout plan introduced by the
FDIC for a short period in 1984 was intended to change
formally the practice of paying off all depositors in the
event of failure. With the modified payout plan, depositors
with balances above the statutory maximum received only
a fraction of their deposit balances based on the FDIC
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evaluation of what it might recover from the liquidation of
assets. Such measures for reforming deposit insurance
are consistent with the small depositor protection rule of
insurance. However,.they are not necessarily.in keeping
with the view that deposit insurance is needed to insure
stability because otmarketfailures(see F\.lrlong.,J~84)
Approachesto reforming deposit insurance through reg-
ulation include risk-related deposit insurance premia and
portfolio-adjustedcapital guidelines. The usual criticism of
the regulatory approach is that it is doubtful that insurance
qgencieS\'ilould besuccess!u\inq$sess.ingriskex.ante.
Proposalsforrisk-related premiaand capital requirements
also have been criticized because they continue the prac-
tice of defining regulatory and supervisory guidelinesin
terms ofbook value rather than marketvalue. One way of
looking at the degree ofsubsidy provided through deposit
insurance is the extentto which it allowsthe marketvalueof
an institution's net worth to go below zero. If all institutions
were closed when the market value of theircapital reaches
zero, there would be no insurance subsidy.REFERENCES
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